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TUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW
AND PROCEDURE
CHESTER

G.

VERNIER

ANTI-NARCOTIC AcT.

United States v. Balint, 42 Sup. Ct. Repr. 301. Whether scienter required.
Since Anti-Narcotic Act Dec. 17, 1914 (Comp. St. Secs. 6287g-6 2 87q), is a
taxing act, with the incidental purpose of minimizing the spread of addiction to
the use of drugs, and -section 2 of the act (Comp. St. Sec. 6287h) makes it
unlawful to sell any of the drugs, except as therein specified, without expressly
requiring knowledge by the seller of the character of the drug sold a person
dealing in drugs is required to ascerfain at his peril whether that which he sells
comes within the statute, so that an indictment for violation of that section need
not allege that defendants knew the character of the drugs sold.
The punishment of a person for an act in violation of law, when he is
ignorant of the facts making it so, docs not deny due process of law.
The common-law rule that scienter was a necessary element of every crime
has been modified in respect to prosecutions under statutes, the purpose of which
would be obstructed by such requirements, and whether it is an element of a
statutory offense is a question of legislative intent.
ATTErPT.

State v. Addor, N. Car. 110 S. E. 650.
Where defendants placed a bag of meal in a swamp, and nailed a coffee
mill to a tree, and placed two empty barrels near the mill, and stated to sheriff
that they intended to make some liquor if they could get a still, but had not
obtained a still or made any liquor at the time of their arrest, there was no
overt act which would warrant a conviction of an attempt to manufacture intoxicating liquors, under C. S. Sec. 4640.
Clark, C. J., dissenting.
ENTRAPMENT.

People v. Tomasovich, Calif. 206 Pac. 119.
Where officers were informed that accused was bootlegging, and went to
his place out of the county and purchased whisky, to be delivered in the county
on the following day, there was no improper enticement, rand his conviction for
the sale of whisky was not opposed to public policy, and court did not err in
refusing to instruct concerning enticement.
EVIDENCE.

Commonwealth v. Voleroso, Pa., 116 Atl. 829. Self-incrimination.
In a prosecution for murder, the act of the commonwealth's attorney in
calling upon defendant, in open court, and before the jury, to produce a letter
forming a link in the chain of incriminating circumstances and in offering
secondary evidence upon defendant's refusal to produce it, was violative of
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defendant's privileges secured by Const., Art. 1, Sec. 9, providing that, in all
criminal prosecutions, accused cannot be compelled to give evidence against
himself.
HoMICID.
People v.Mnriquez, Calif., 206 Pac. 63. Unintended killing in commisswn
of robbery.
A homicide, committed in the perpetration of a robbery, was murder in the
first degree, under Pen. Code, Sec. 189, notwithstanding defendant's claim that
the pistol went off when his victim grabbed at it.
INDICTMENT.

U. S. v. Moreland, 42 Sup. Ct Repr. 368. "Infamous crime."
Imprisonment at hard labor renders an-offense punishable thereby infamous,
regardless of the place of imprisonment, so that a prosecution for an offense
which may be punished by an imprisonment in the workhouse of the District
of Columbia at hard labor can only be instituted by presentment or indictment
by the grand jury, under Const. U. S. Amend. 5.
Whether an offense is infamous depends on the punishment which may be
imposed therefor, not on the punishment which was imposed; so that it was not
error for the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia to hold Act March
23, 1906, which permitted a fine or imprisonment at hard labor for refusal to
support minor children, after prosecution in the juvenile court instituted by
information and not by indictment, unconstitutional, and to direct the dismssal
of the case, instead of sending it back for the imposition of a fine.
Mr. Justice Brandeis, Mr. Chief Justice Taft, and Mr. Justice Holmes
dissenting.
JURISDICTION.

Ponzi v. Fessenden, 42 Sup. Ct. Repr. 309. Jurisdiction of state court over
federal convict.
Where a federal District Court first took custody of a person and sentenced
him to imprisonment, no state court could assume control of him until the end
of his term without the consent of the United States.
Rev. St. Sec. 5539 (Comp. St. Sec. 10523), making federal convicts imprisoned in a state jail or penitentiary exclusively under the control of the
officers in charge of the penitentiary does not deprive the Attorney General of
power to consent that such convict may be removed from a state institution in the
custody of a federal agent to be tried for another offense in the state court.
Where a federal convict is taken into a state court for trial during his prison
term, there is no difficulty with respect to the execution of sentence imposed by
a state court, which may be made to commence at the expiration of the term
of his federal sentence.
The fact that a federal convict indicted in a state court must remain in
custody of a federal agent during his trial in the state court does not deprive
the state court of jurisdiction to try him, since he is present in the state court
and can conduct his defense as effectively as if he were in custody of officers
of that court.
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PARENT AND CHILD.

Butler v. Commonwealth, Va., 110 S. E. 868. Liability of husband to support
children wrongfully taken from home by wife.
In a prosecution, under Code 1919, Secs. 1936, 1937, for wilful neglect
and refusal of defendant to support his wife and infant children, where his
wife left him and took the children, without reasonable excuse, and defendant
was willing to support them to the extent of his ability if they would live
with him, he was not liable, regardless of failure to use legal process to
regain possession of the children.
At common law, a father has the right to maintain his children in his
own house, and cannot be compelled against his will to do so elsewhere, unless
he has refused or failed to provide for them where he lives.
PAROLE.

State v. Yates, N. Car., 111 S. E. 337. "Parole" construed as conditional
pardon.
Since neither Const., Art. 3, Sec. 6, nor the states (C. S., Secs. 76427644, 7749, 7752, et seq.), relatives to pardons, authorize a "parole," unless
the word be construed as importing a conditional pardon, an order granting
a parole must be interpreted as a pardon on condition that the recipient
comply with the terms imposed.
If the conditions contained in a parole or conditional pardon be not
illegal, immoral, or impossible of performance, the recipient, by accepting
the pardon, accepts such conditions, a breach of which avoids the pardon
and subjects him to rearrest and reincarceration to serve the balance of his
unexpired term, though the time for which he was sentenced has expired;
the essential part of the sentence being the punishment, and not the time
when it shall begin or end.
SENTENCE.

State v. Starwich, Wash., 206 Pac. 29. Validity of suspended sentence law.
Laws 1921, p. 204, authorizing the trial judge to suspend sentence in
certain cases, is not invalid as conflicting with Const., Art. 3, Sec. 9, providing
that "the pardoning power shall be vested in the governor, under such regulations and restrictions as may be prescribed by law," and Section 11, providing that "the governor shall have power to remit fines and forfeitures,
under such regulations as may be prescribed by law," since the sentence is
suspended by the court before it is put into effect, and the power of the
parol board, of which the governor is a member, is exercised only after
sentence has been put into operation.
TRIAL.
State v. Latthnar, W. Va., 111 S. E. 510. Effect of effort to speed ip a
murder trial.
Where a person has been arrested for an alleged crime, committed on
the day of the arrest, and on the day following is indicted, tried, convicted,
sentenced to hang, and immediately taken to the penitentiary for that purpose, and it appears that he has been given no time to prepare his defense,
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was assigned counsel after he announced that he was ready for trial, and
pleaded not guilty, and the judge certifies that he knew that feeling was
running high against the accused in and about the courthouse, and that
he had some fear of mob violence being inflicted upon the accused if a
speedy trial was not had, and it appears that no witnesses were summoned
for the defendant, no motion made for change of venue, improper evidence
admitted on the trial without objection on the prisoner's part, and a feeble
and perfunctory defense interposed, the appellate court will set aside the
verdict and award the prisoner a new trial, because he has not been
accorded a fair and impartial trial.
Melton v. Commonwealth, Va., 111 S. E. 291. Correcting verdict after discharge of jury.
Where the court told the jury after a verdict of guilty of rape that
they were discharged, and the jurors thereupon returned to the jury room
accompanied by the sheriff to claim attendance fees, but were thereafter
recalled by the court upon discovery that the jury had ma'de a mistake in
fixing the penalty under Code 1919, Sec, 4414, and again retired and returned
another verdict, such other verdict could not support a conviction, having
been rendered after discharge.
So long as the whole jury are in the actual and visible presence of the
court, and under its control, an inadvertent announcement of their discharge
Tay be recalled as a matter still in the breast of the court, but, after they
have left the court's presence, their functions as jurors have ended, and they
cannot, either with or without the consent of the court, amend or alter their
verdict,
Prentis, J., dissenting.

